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MATURE OF THE CASE
This is a partial judgment quieting title in Plaintiffs'

to a one-sixth interest in two mining claims.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was resolved by Summary Judgment on Plain-

tiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
A0~ellant

favor as a

~atter

seeks a reversal and judgment in his

of law or a new trial.

The Respondents seek affirmance of the judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Appellant's statement of facts is accurate and
fairly reported so far as they go.

However, there are other

material facts that Respondents wish to present to the Court.
Parenthetically, one statement made on page 8 of
appellant's brief is accurate but possibly disarming, and
might suggest that the Bamberger interests had not paid
the taxes on the property, the subject of this 1/6 interest
for the years 1974 through 1977, which is not the fact.
The exhibit provoking Appellant's statement was Exhibit #9,
an abstracter's certificate (R-89).

Such certificate, with

an attached chart, clearly shows that the taxes on the onesixth interest were fully paid for each of said years, and
any implication in Appellant's brief, pp. 8-9, to the effect
that there may have been a "redemption," rather than "payment" of taxes would be without support in the record.
In addition to what is said in Appellant's brief,
and without unnecessary repetition the following factual
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

background also appears from the record:
The original source of title ta the mining claims
involved here, was the U. S. Patent issued ta the defendants
Clark on July 12, 1909 (R-21 and Ex. P6) that created a
tenancy in common for lack of language specifying otherwise,
which, under Sec. 1973 of the 1907 Compiled Laws of Utah
1907 (now 57-1-5, U.C.A., 1953), created such tenancy. 1

The

patent included the Virginia, Virginia #1, April and April
Fraction claims.
Two years later, on July 31, 1911, the Clarks, by
"Deed" (R-94) quitclaimed a one-third interest in only two
of the claims, - the April and Virginia, - to Ernest Bamberger and Russell G. Schulder.

Bamberger was a long time,

well-known "mining man," and Schulder a practicing "lawyer."
The former died in 1958, the latter in 1926, leaving estates.
Schulder's estate was probated and is still pending, the
present litigation having to do with the rights of the two
grantees and their successors in the property deeded to them
in July, 1911.

The Administrator of Schulder's estate was

W. T. Gunter, who died in 1932.
The Patent and Deed established three important
facts:
1) That the subject property was "mining" property, primarily to develop minerals "for the use of the
occupant" (one of the three purposes necessary for acquiring
adverse title under Sec. 78-12-9, U.C.A., 1953);
2) That those instruments created a present and
continuing possession right in the patentees (Clarks) and
1.

D.&.R.G.R.R. v. S. L.

I~v.

Co., 35 Utah 528.
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their successors, Bamberger, Schulder, et al., that would
satisfy "possession requirements" necessary to establish
adverse possession under "Sec. 78-12-7, Adverse
Possession"; and
3) Furnished any of such patentees and their
successors, any necessary "color of title" to establish
title by adverse possession under Sec. 78-12-7, U.C.A.,
1953 based on a "Written Instrument. 112
The parties have stipulated that at least since
1938, the Bamberger interests have paid all taxes on the
subject mining claims.

This alone eliminates any necessity

further to prove the tax payment requirements found in the
adverse possession statutes, as well it should dispel any
confusion mentioned above as to plaintiffs' pleading a cause
of action based on a written instrument.
The history and rights of the defendants Clark are
not actually germane to this, the remaining part of the
litigation, since this Court already has quieted title in
the plaintiffs to five-sixths of the interest asserted in
the April and Virginia claims (R-64 and R-76).

The only

circumstances that may be of some interest here having
reference to the Clarks, is that the tax "notices," since
the 1911 ''Deed" to Bamberger and Schulder, have been sent to
Bamberger's office at 163 Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah,
which notices sometimes combined the

Bamberger-Cl~rk

names

2.
Respondents urge and argue, infra, that Appell~nt's
contention in his Brief (R-172) that Respondents' claim is
not founded on a written instrument, is without merit and
must be the result either of failure to read or mis-reading of Respondents' Second Cause of Action (R-304) and other
parts of the complaint, which see.
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and other times were sent separately in the names of Bamberger-Clark and

sep~rat~l;

in the names of Bamberger-

Schulder, which appears to be a procedure of the County
Treasurer.
There has been no offer made by Russell G. Schulder,
grantee and co-tenant in the 1911 deed, nor by W. T. Gunter,
Administrator of Schulder's estate, nor by Russell Graydon
Schulder, present

Administr~t·i~

nf the estate, nor by anyone

else since at least 1957 (Ex. P-1), nor by any of the
Schulders or anyone else shown in the record or by the
defendant, Russell Graydon Schulder, individually or as
Administrator, to reimburse Ernest Bamberger or any of his
successors, for taxes paid, expenses incurred or other
expense incident to the preservation or operation of the
claims.
Nor has any offer of reimbursement been made or
tendered into court ac any time during the pendency of this
litigation before the appeal of this case.
There was but one time when the Bambergers' claim
to the property was in dispute, and then only by way of
Summit County's claim for non-payment of the taxes for the
year 1942.

On that occasion Bamberger, through his account-

ant, made objection to the County's claim to the property
by reason of tax delinquency, who promptly advised the
County Assessor and Treasurer (R-110) of a double assessment.

The County acknowledged the error at a regularly

called Commission meeting on Nov. 1, 1943, and the minutes
reflect that the taxes had been paid timely by Ernest BnmSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-4Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

berger.

The Commission ordered that the double assessment

be eliminated "without costs to Ernest Bamberger."

(R-118).

Such error on the part of the County does not even appear in
the Abstract.
Contrary to what the Appellant contends and in
spite of the obvious and extreme difficulty in obtaining
evidence as to the history of a mining claim operation in
rather remote areas extending over more than a half century
span, the record is not devoid of facts showing preservation
and maintenance of the claims as the Appellant would have
this Court believe.

The record reflects the location of the

claims, proof of labor and assessment work by the Patent
itself, together with evidence of some development or operational work, as reflected in the affidavit of a prominent
lawyer and early participant in working on mining properties
in the area, and specifically on Bamberger claims, who, as a
young man, with his father, performed work on "claims owned
by the Bamberger family," and that he is generally familiar
with the claims owned by that family.

(Ex. P.3).

Other prominent people having knowledge of the
area, were acquainted with the Bamberger interests and dealt
with them on an across the board basis, with the assumption
that Bambergers were the sole and only owners of the claims,
even to an extent of agreeing orally and in writing to
settle boundaries between their contiguous claims and those
of the Bambergers, as sole owners of their respective claims
with no reference to the Clarks, Schulders or anyone else
(Osika Dep. R-120; 138, 139; Communication, R-141; AffiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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davit, R-143; Affidavit, R-145).
The claims involved here were not listed in the
Inventory of Russell G. Schulder's estate, by the latter's
Administrator, W. T. Gunter, who, like Schulder, was a
practicing lawyer; and there is nothing in the record to
indicate by pleading or affidavit, that Schulder ever mentioned the claims or offered reimbursement, for taxes and
expenses, nor was an accounting ever shown to have been
requested by him or anyone else.

The record does show,

however, that five separate claims of interest in mining or
other real property in several different counties (R-103)
were listed, with no listing of the April and Virginia
claims, the subject of this litigation.
The record clearly shows that there is nothing in
the pleadings that specifically refutes or explains such
failure to list or claim an interest in the claims, nor has
a claim or supplementary inventory and appraisement requested or filed in Russell G. Schulder's estate.

Nor is

there any affidavit, or even unsworn document or answer to
interrogatories shown in the record that is called for and
required under 56(e) of the Rules, to

re~ute

material facts

shown in the record in support of plaintiffs cause that
. d gment. 3
might preclude summary JU

To any suggestion appellant might make to the
effect that the Bamberger interests have not laid any claim
3.
Rule 56(e), entitled "Form of Affidavits; Further
Testimony; Defense Required," says:
"Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall
set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence and
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to
the matters stated therein."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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in the property involved here and claimed by the appellant,
counsel for appellant have, in fairness, conceded that the
abstract of title shows that in a Deed issued by the Trustee
in the Estate of Eleanor F. Bamberger, he conveyed an undivided interest in "all" of the claims involved in the
present suit, on July 25, 1962.

Eleanor was the sole bene-

ficiary of whatever Ernest had in such claims.

The convey-

ance was eighteen years before the present suit was filed,
well in excess of the seven year adverse title requirements.
It is significant that the record shows that all taxes were
paid on the claims involved here, the claims were possessed
since that time, and the operation of the Trustee's Deed
obviously was a "hostile" act reflecting both an intention
to adverse, and by its recordation, a notice to any party
claiming an interest in the property, including the Schulders.
ARGUMENT
I

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THERE
WAS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT TO RESOLVE.
Rule 56(e), that implements Rule 56(c), U.R.C.P.
1953,

4

sets forth the procedure to determine whether a Sum-

mary Judgment is appropriate and reads as follows:
4.
"(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion shall
be served at least ten days before the time fixed for the
hearing.
The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may
serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of
liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the
amount of damages."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"(e)
Form of Affidavits; Further
Testimony; Defense Required.
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be
made on personal knowledge, s0all set
forth such facts as would be admissibl?
in evidence, and shall s<1,•w ,J,ftirma,ti'i'"l'.-_
that the affiant is co~pet2nt to tPs~ fy
to the matters stated i::1erel:l.
Swurc1 or
certified copies of all papers or parts
thereof referred to in an affidavit shall
be attached thereto or served therewith.
The court may permit affidavits to be
supplemented or opposed by depositions,
answers to interrogatories, or further
affidavits.
When a motion for summary
judgent is made and supported as provided
in this Rule, an adverse party may not
rest upon the mere allegations or denia~~
of his pleading, but his response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in
this Rule, must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.
If he does not so respond,
summary judgment, if appropriate, shall
be entered against him.
The Answer filed by the appellant is not under oath,
and even if it were it is simply a general denial, accompa.nied by two "affirmative" unverified defenses saying that
1) if the plaintiffs used the property

"openly or notor-

iously" as alleged, it was with the defendants' consent, and
that 2) if the plaintiffs paid the taxes as alleged, it was
done "voluntarily."
Where a prima facie case has been made out by the
plaintiffs' pleadings and supporting affidavits, verified
answers to interrogatories and the like, under Rule 56(e) as
has been done here, a motion for Summary Judgment shall be
granted, as was done here, and the Supreme Court will affirm,
as demonstrated by its numerous precedents, some of which are
called to its attention, such as:
Thornock V. Cook,
5.

5

where it was said throug~

604 P.2d 934 (Utah 1979).
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Mr. Justice Stewart, that:
"The defendant cannot rely on the
mere allegations or denials of her
pleadings to avoid a Summary Judgment,
but must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial,
Rule 56(e) U.R.C.P."
This basic principle has been repeated and reaffirmed many times by this Court, by different language
saying about the same thing.

Perhaps the most frequently

cited case is Dupler v. Yates,

6

which has the following to

say:
"When adequate proof is submitted in
support of the motion, the pleadings are
not sufficient to raise an issue of fact."
Again, the Court said:
"Upon motion for summary judgment,
the courts ought to recognize, as a minimum, that the opposing party produce some
evidentiary matter in contradiction of
the movant's case or specify in an affidavit the reason why he cannot do so."
7
A more recent case, James v. Hinkle , authored by
Mr. Justice Stewart, unanimously stated the purpose of Rule
56(e) to be as follows:
"Pursuant to Rule 56(e), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, when a motion for
summary judgment is made, the affidavit
of an adverse party must contain specific evidentiary facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial. Walker
v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp.,
29 Utah 2d 274, 508 P.2d 538 (1973);
Preston v. Lamb, 20 Utah 2d 260, 436
P.2d 1021 (1968). Defendants have
failed to identify with specificity any
material issue of fact, and plaintiff, as
a matter of law, is entitled to conveyance
of the title."
6.
7.

10 Utah 2d 251, 351 P.2d 624 (1960).
611 P.2d 733 (1980).
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In Walker v. Rocky Mtn. Rec. Corp.,
do with an affidavit in opposition to a

8

~otion

which had to
for Summary

Judgment, in holding that the defendan: did not preclude
summary judgment because there remained a genuine issue of
fact,

the Utah Supreme Court took the position that no further

findings were necessary because:
"The opposing affidavit submitted by
the defendant did not comport with the
requirements of Rule 56(e), i.e., such
affidavit must be made on personal knowledge of the affiant."
See also Western States v. Blomquist.

9

In the instant case, the appellant Schulder filed
no affidavit whatever, and his pleading simply was an unsworn
general denial, and two conclusions that even were prefaced
by "ifs."
The interpretations of Rules 56(c) and (e) have
been affirmed in many other cases, including Albrecht v.
Uranium Services,

10

involving "abandonment" of mining claims.

In a split decision, Mr. Justice 'vlaughan, author, and Mr.
Justice Stewart differed, but only as to whether the "facts"
did or did not present a genuine "issue," but not as to interpretation of Rule 56, in which they agreed.
v. 'vl.S.T.T.

See also Jensen

11

The most recent pronouncement by the Supreme
Court, which requires counter-affidavits on Motion for Summary
Judgment under Rule 56(e) is Clarkson v. Western Heritage,
8.
29 Utah 2d 274, 508 P.2d 538 (1973).
9.
29 Utah 2d 58, 504 P.2d 1019 (1972).
10.
596 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1979).
11.
611 P.2d 363 (Utah 1980).
-10-
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Utah, 627 P.2d 72 (1981), written by Judge Gould, District
Judge, which re-affirms the decisions set out hereinabove,
in the following language:
"Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment
was supported by affidavit, which recited
facts sufficient to found jurisdiction
in the State of Arizona. This affidavit
was not countered by an opposing aff~
davi t by defendants. Our Rule 56(e)
clearly requires an opposing affidavit
in order to create a genuine issue of
material fact, and does not permit a
party to rely upon his pleading to create
a disputed fact issue. The trial court
correctly took the facts set forth in the
plaintiffs' affidavit to be true, and
ruled accordingly. We find no error in
the trial court's ruling on the summary
judgment motion."
[Emphasis supplied]
The Appellant's First Point on appeal claims that
his "Answer" and his "Memorandum" filed in this case raised
genuine issues of fact.

Neither pleading was verified, neither

was supported by any affidavit, nor by anyone claiming to be
competent to testify, as is required under Rule 56(e), and the Point, therefore, is of no avail whatever in forcing
a trial of issues that the Rule says can be tried if, and
only if, the defendant, one way or another submits 1) specific
facts, 2) under oath in order to preclude the granting of a
Motion for Summary Judgment.
Assuming, arguendo that he had offered statements
under oath, which he clearly did not do, he says erroneously
that his Answer and Memorandum would raise the following
issues:
a) "Possession of the Bambergers for the necessary
seven years to adverse.

This is not an issue here, since

the Bambergers have had a right of possession by virtue of a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tenancy-in-common deed, dated in 1911, and their pleadings
and affidavits reflect that recorded fact, as shown in the
abstract of title.
b) Whether Bambergers paid the taxes "voluntarily," which may be answered by saying that, first,

it makes

no difference under the statute how the taxes are paid, and
it would be an unusual case where one claiming by ''adverse
possession" did not pay the taxes other than "voluntarily";
and
c) Whether the taxes levied were paid according to
law.

This so-called "issue" also is not an issue here, since

it obviously is born of appellant's error in examining the
the record, since he relies on "non-payment of taxes for the
years 1974 through 1977, saying in his Brief, pp. 8-9:
"However, the taxes levied on the
claims were not paid on such interests
for the years 1974, 1975, 1976 and l977."
He then claims they were "redeemed."

An examina-

tion of the Record clearly shows that what appellant is talking
about is the two-thirds interest of Clarks, the original
patentees, and that with respect to the one-third interest
conveyed by them to Bamberger and Schulder, the taxes have
been paid on time and have never been delinquent, as shown
in the record.

(Ex. 8).

From the above, any attack on the judgment based
on error in granting the Motion for Summary Judgment, is
withou~

any merit, since appellant, under the statutes and

the cases construing them, not shown any effort by him or
his predecessors to do anything in compliance with the
statutes or the case law applicable to adverse possession
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situations.
Clearly, the lower Court's summary judgment should
be affirmed, since the appellant has not complied with Rules
56(c) and (e) in any manner.
II

THE FACTS SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT"S JUDGMENT.
Although we contend the failure of appellant to
comply in any way with Rules 56(c) and (e), is dispositive
here without deciding Point II, we address that Point by
briefly reviewing the facts and pertinent authorities to refute appellant's claim of insufficiency of the evidence.
As a preliminary matter, it is conceded that this
is a proper case where one co-tenant may claim title by
adverse possession; that to acquire such title, the claimant
must have a) an intention to do so, b) a possession that is
inconsistent with the co-tenant's interest (which the cases
variously term as "open," "notorious," "adverse," "hostile"
or the like, c) coupled with the co-tenant's knowledge
thereof, or that which reasonably he should know by "notice"
given by the adversing co-tenant,

12

or by circumstances that

reasonably would impart such notice to such co-tenant.

13

Also, that "adverse possession" statutes are not
only 1) limitation statutes, but 2) such as expressly are
12. 82 A.L.R.2d 5.
13. Elder v. McCluskey, 70 F. 529:
"The adverse claimant
need not give actual notice, but need only to 'bring it home
to bis co-tenant by his conduct, the implication of which
cannot escape the notice of the world about him, or of
anyone, though not a resident of the neighborhood, who bas
an interest in the property, and exercises that degree of
attention in respect to what is his, that the law presumes
in every owner.'"
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-13-

based on "presumptions" such as Sec. 78-12-7, U.C.A., 1953,
that indulges 1) a presumption of ownership in the record
title holder and 2) that occupation by anyone else is subordinate thereto, unless occupied adversely by the latter
for seven years,

- with the necessary implication that the

latter has at least one leg up on acquiring the former's
title.

Sec. 78-12-7.1 also expressly presumes ownership in

a tax title claimant who shows possession for 4 years to the
exclusion of the record owner.

Such presumptions have

statutory probative force such as do common law presumptions
where guaranty of truthfulness is attributed to a number of
reasons.

Some have to do with "passage of time," a "lost"

or "pre-sumed" grant, "continued payment of taxes," "quiet
enjoyment for a long time," "failure of owners to assert
rights for a long time," "notice of adverse user by filing
suit," policy of "repose" in making certain title to propperty, etc.

All these would appear pertinent in this case,

where continuity of treatment of the property began about
seventy years ago in 1909 and has persisted even up to the
time of judgment in this case.
Clotworthy v. Clyde, 14 a Utah case, adheres to the
principle that conduct alone, by acts inconsistent with
ownership in another, is tantamount to and presumably effective in establishing title by adverse possession.
Irrespective of, but in addition to, and as a
separate basis for satisfying the principle that one should
have notice about any adverse use before divestiture of an
265 P.2d 420; see also Smith v. Hamakua, 13 Hawaii
14.
716; Mounce v. Hargis, 278 S.W. 107.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-14-

interest, it is held that bringing an action to quiet title
in and of itself constitutes notice sufficient to establish
title, along with other facts, in one claiming by adverse
Peper v. Trust Co. 15

use.

Other typical facts showing an adverse user and
notice thereof by prescription is shown in Richins v.
Struhs

16

an adverse possession case involving a driveway,

which said:
"The origin and purpose of their
recognition arises out of the general
policy of the law of assuring the peace
and good order of society by leaving a
long establilshed status quo at rest
rather than by disturbing it • • •
Consequently it should be given effect
to prevent the very thing which defendants have attempted here: the upsetting
of a situation which has existed amicably since "the memory of man runneth
not to the contrary."
In Baber v. Baber, 94 S.E. 209 (Va. 1917) it was
held that where a tenant had had possession of the property
for 34 years, that notice "may be presumed from a great
lapse of time, with other circumstances."
In an old "leading" case stressing long-possession
as being an important factor for a jury to consider in
determining an effective adverse possession on the basis of
a co-tenant's knowledge thereof sufficient to affirm a
verdict to that effect, is Doe, ex Fishar v. Prasser, 98
Eng. Reprint 1052 (1774), where possession for 36 years was
claimed to be sufficient for an "ouster" on the basis of
long possession reflecting co-tenants "notice" or "knowledge," Lord Mansfield left it to the jury to say "whether
15.
16.

219 s.w. 942.
17 Utah 2d 356, 412 P.2d 314 (1966).
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there was not sufficient evidence before them to presume an
actual ouster," and the jury having so fo11nd, Loci '13.nsf ield
then said "they were w:i.rranted by the length ': f

~

irr:.c> to

presume an adverse possession by one of the ten:i.nts in
common," - and the other circumstances of the case were t'1a. ':
the adverse co-tenants never sought an accounting from the
plaintiff co-tenant.

This case, besides imposing a duty on

the part of a disseised tenant to seek such an accounting
from the co-tenant trying to disseise him, along with other
cases, firmly establishes that the question of adverse possession is a jury question based on a "reasonable ;nan"
concept.
The Bamberger interests having had the right of
possession and paying the taxes continuously for at least 40
years, and presumptively for 70 years from 1911, the date of
the deed, certainly is evidence of notice of their claim to
the Schulders, who have had an opportunity to learn of such
adverse claim by such possession, payment of taxes, common
knowledge of those in the neighborhood, preservation of the
claim against double tax assessment by the County and filing
of this lawsuit, after which, up to and including date of
judgment, neither appellant nor Schulder's estate, nor any
other Schulder has as much as offered to pay any pro rata
taxes levied, or expenses incurred on the property.
For some unknown reason, the appellant,

in its

Trial Memorandum" spent a good portion thereof in assarting
that the respondents'

"claim of adverse possession is not

founded on a written instrument or judgment under color of
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title" under Sec. 78-12-8, and discusses other statutes and
authorities that in no way are germane to respondents'
written instrument claim under Sec. 78-12-8.

At the bottom

of page 2 of the First Cause of Action, the complaint alleges
ownership by virtue of a written quitclaim deed, in the
April and Virginia claims which was incorporated in the
Second Cause as being with ''color of title," and alleging an
open and notorious possession as against "all persons,
including the defendants."
The above observations are made to eliminate doubt
or confusion as to the nature of one of plaintiffs' claims.
The appellant apparently has abandoned any argument on this
point, since it is not repeated in his brief on appeal, nor
is it assigned as a Point on Appeal.

Hence, the only matters

that need to be demonstrated on appeal to affirm the summary
judgment, are those in satisfaction of the pertinent parts
of Sec. 78-12-9, "What Constitutes Adverse Possession Under
Written Instrument," which, eliminating parts unnecessary to
prove in this case, reads as follows:
"78-12-9. What constitutes adverse
possession under written instrument. For the purpose of constituting an adverse
possession by any person claiming a title
founded upon a written instrument 5?.E. ~
judgment or decree, land is deemed to
have been possessed and occupied in the
following cases:
(1)
(2)

(3) Where, although not inclosed
it has been used • • . for the ordinary use of the occupant.
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Sub-sections (1) and (2) need not be proved singly
or in tandem to perfect title by adverse possession.
Sub-section (3) needs satisfying.

Only

In Tol C:ec Ranch v. Babcoc'{, l:

an unfenced mining claim case where an "adverse use" was
held to have established title under Sec. 78-12-9, Subsection (3) "for the ordinary use of the occupant," there
was only a small part of the adversed land occupied and used
for storing vehicles over a 34 year continuous period, the
Utah Court said:
"The land was occupied and used the
same as other lands were in the neighor=:hood. -The possession wasOpen, notorious •
• and under claim of right.
It must, therefore, necessarily be deemed
to have been adverse to the holder of the
legal title, and such long-continued
possession may be deemed to have been
adverse, though not in character hostile.
Where one is shown t()have been in
possession as owner for the period of
limitation, apparently as owner, and
such possession is not explained or otherwise accounted for, it wi 11 be presumed
to have been adverse:"

-----

In Cooper v. Carter, 7 Utah 2d 9, 316 P.2d 320
(1957) where the land was unfenced, and involved "color of
title," a Title 78-12-12 adverse possession situation, "for
the ordinary use of the occupant," with payment of taxes,
the court, after saying the possession need be open and notorious, said, however, that fencing the property was not
dispositive, and that:
it is common knowledge that in
the unfenced grazing areas of our state
entry or trespass is commonly done and is
not regarded as of any serious impact.
People often go on such lands for riding,
17.

24 Utah 183, 66 P. 876 (1901).
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hiking, hunting and other innocuous
purposes •
. without any objection from
the owners."
So saying, the court upheld an adverse possession
claim of title, where a sheep man grazed his sheep, with
exclusive possession, for only three weeks

~

year, for over

seven years."
Compare the facts in that case with the facts in
the instant case.
As to Schulder's knowledge of the adverse claim
asserted by the Bamberger interests, it is significant that
the appellant filed precisely nothing, sworn or not-sworn,

specifically evidencing any absence of knowledge or "notice"
of the latter's adverse claims.

This failure to assert any

claim at any time, under oath, or not under oath, should
foreclose any claim of "genuine issue of fact" that has to
be set out specifically under Rules 56(c) and (e).
Under the authorities, it is almost inconceivable
that the appellant and his predecessors had no "notice" of
Ernest Bambergers mining activities in the area and his
adverse claim.

His co-grantee, a lawyer, during his life-

time, from 1911 to 1926 and for 15 years, at no time registered any interest in these claims, or made any claim of
an interest in them or offered to share in taxes or expense
that can be found in the record.

Nor was any hint made in

any affidavit, or other document as to any interest in the
claims.

Even the lawyer who was appointed administrator of

Schulder's estate did not list any interest in the inventory
and appraisement, nothing appears in the record to indicate
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any such listing.

On the contrary, the inventory that was

filed specifically listed real properties by metes and
bounds situate in Sevier County, Utah; Lots 28 and 29 in
Block 7, Arlington Heights, in Salt Lake County; an undivided interest in the Braffet Coal Land case pending in the
U. S. Supreme Court; an undivided interest in the Davis Oil
Shale lands;" and an undivided interest in the Milner-Carbon
County Coal case pending in the same court.

Since the

filing of that inventory, the defendant here, Russell Graydon Schulder, son of the grantee, and his present administrator, has done nothing over the past 31 years, nor has
Maude L. Schulder, wife of the decedent, nor bas Ann Schulder,
daughter of the decedent, done anything whatever by way of
payment of any assessed taxes, offering to pay any pro rata
share of any taxes paid or expenses incurred by Bambergers,
nor is there anything in the abstract of title, in the
record, or by any other evidence that any of said heirs, or
their decedent father, have ever been present on the claims
or done anything at all to support any claim whatever hat
they might have asserted in said claims other than is evidenced by a single document, the 68 year old deed mentioned
hereinabove.

Such failure is quite inconsistent with the

established presumption that an owner will watch over and do
what is necessary to protect his property.
Our own Supreme Court in Godfrey v. Munson, 597
P.2d 885, has considered the importance of such failure to
list

~ssets

in proving adverse possession in another.

In

Godfrey there was a family difference, where one side claimed
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under a written instrument (deed) but nonetheless failed in
establishing title against one having a history of long
possession (67 years), where this Court assigned as a
significant factor, the fact that "the property was not
included in the estate of Eliza M. Pack Godfrey."
Furthermore, since the complaint was filed, which
in itself is "notice" of the adverse claim of plaintiffs,
the defendant has had knowledge of the claim ever since
has not offered to pay any share of taxes or expense, nor
made any tender in court to cover any such share, nor offered
a bond to secure payment of any such amounts.
The authorities touchng the question of what kind
of adverse possession is necessary to import notice to
interested persons vary in definition, but they generally
require that something be done that either gives actual or
constructive notice that would put an erstwhile record owner
on guard to protect his property against one who claims an
adverse interest under the statute or the common law.
Otherwise, the doctrine of "repose" can operate to accomplish a divestiture.
Harking back to the adverse possession statutes
involved in this case, the Courts have seen fit to interpret
their provisions as to what kind of adverse possession is
necessary to satisfy them.

For example, 78-12-9, - where

the adverse possession required is found in the subdivision:
(1) "cultivation or improvement,"£.!:. (2) fencing,£.!:.,

(3)

where "although uninclosed," by occupation "for the ordinary
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use of the occupant."
As to re<-iuire'"'.l•"nts unrl.er the statute, "open,
notorious and adverse," generally are said by the cases to
be adverbs that are synonymous, meaning the same, and not
connoting "hostile" as a layman might conclude.

On the

contrary they may mean even "friendly, such as enunciated in
Quincy v. Kratiz, 328 N.E.2d 699, where a family dispute
arose as to entitlement of "':h<? property, - where one member
claimed by adverse possession, the court said:
"While we recognize that for possession to be hostile in its inception, no
spirit of animosity or hostility is re=
quired nor need the adverse claimant be
guilty of deliberate or wilful tortious
conduct, (Wijas v. Clorfene, 126 Ill.App.
2d 315, 262, N.E.2d 830, it has been held
that using and controlling the property
as an owner is the ordinary way of asserting title thereto."
Richards v. Struhs, 17 Utah 2d 356, 412 P.2d 314
(Utah 1966), adhered to such position, quoting another case
that re-affirmed the concept with more emphasis by saying:
"The elements of a title by limitation are uninterrupted possession - actual,
visible, notorious, adverse, and hostile,
under color and claim of right for the
statutory period.
'The words adverse and
hostile mean practically the same thing.'
And either of them can be omitted in defining the character of the possession,
provided the other is used."
As to the Schulders' doing anything to show any
claim to the property, Plaintiffs' affidavits tend to show
that Russell G. Schulder and his successors were and are
unknown in mining circles, as claimants of an interest in
the property subject of this litigation.

The owners of

claims contiguous therewith, to-wit, the SilvPr Queen and
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two Lilly claims, owned by United Park City Corp. before and
after 1958 and at this time, have not been aware of anyone
named Schulder claiming an interest in the April and Virginia
claims, as reflected in Mr. Osika's affidavit.

The record

shows that these owners actually settled their boundary
lines between their claims and the plaintiffs' claims,
without concerning any claim of the Schulders, which reflects the common knowledge and understanding in the mining
community that the Bamberger interests were the sole owners
of the property.

The same is reflected in a letter from one

Huseth, addressed to W. H. Olwell, plaintiff herein, dated
June 2, 1980, describing a sewer easement he sought to
acquire.

The letter and "location map" are in evidence,

and were forwrded to Olwell, as representative of the Bambergers as sole owners.

Nothing was mentioned as to any

joint interest with any other possible claimants or the
Schulders.
The same treatment by others in the mining industry,
based on an assumption that no one but the Bambergers owned
the claims, reflects a common understanding in the area that
the Bambergers were sole owners, holding themselves out to
the world, including Schulders as being the sole owners of
the claims, lending considerable substance to the fact that
Schulders must have had knowledge of Bambergers' adverse
intention and claim or that a strong presumption exists that
they did or should have had such knowledge.

Such under-

standing in the neighborhood would justify a finding even of
abandonment, which has been alleged here but not canvassed
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in length.

(Noebuck v. Mecasta, 229 N.W.2d 343 (Mich);

Jakober v. Loews, 265 A.2d 429).
It would appear that somewhere along the line the
Schulders, if they claimed any interest at all, reasonably
should have known what the Bambergers' have been claiming,
and what the understanding in the community has been, as
reflected by contiguous owners who even settled their own
boundaries on the assumption that the Bambeger people were
sole owners.
Besides, there is competent authority to the
effect that an owner is bound to know about an adverse
useage of his property.

In Alaska Bank v. Linck, 559 P.2d

1049 (Alaska), it was said that:
"The owner need not actually know
about the presence of an adverse possession;
what a duly alert owner would have known,
the owner is~ged withlmOwing,"° and
where possession is otherwise proven,
courts generally recognize that community
repute as well as physical visibility
is relevant evidence that the true owner
has been put on notice.- - - - - - - - - The affidavits of E. Lamar Oshika, Donald Dixon
and William H. Olwell, all attest to the fact that the
Schulders failed to exercise the required "diligence'' in
protecting any claimed interest, over a 68 year period.
are attestations reflecting the Schulders'

They

"knowledge" or

reason to know of Bambergers' claim.
Other representative cases of adverse user that would
give notice or knowledge of a person's adverse claim, are:
Adams v. Johnson, 136 N.W.2d 78, involving a family
dispute based on color of title and adverse possession, the
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court said that to overcome the presumption of the sort of
"per tout et non per my" concept of co-tenancy, the court said
what courts generally espouse, that:

"An express notice is

not necessary, an intention to hold the land adversely to
the owners may be derived from all the circumstances of the
case."

In that case the court pointed out that two brothers'

possession was actual, open and notorious, farming as owners
for 50 years, payng the taxes, and that "the surrounding
neighbors and acquaintances considered them to be the sole
owners" and went even so far as to say "we do not think that
ignorance of ownership by a co-tenant out of possession is
necessarily conclusive against a finding of adverse possession by a co-tenant in possession."

Clotworthy v. Clyde,

supra, also subscribes to the principle that actual notice
of the claim of adverse possession may be unnecessary.
The very recent case of Alaska v. Linck, 589 P.2d
1049 (1977) where both the parties claimed under written
instruments, or "color of title" was determined on Motion
For Summary Judgment, as here, based on affidavits anent
adverse possession, as filed here.

The determination of

ownership was arrived at under the provisions of a
year statute idential to ours.

~

That case considers most

of the dispositive features of this case, and its language and
citation of authority are supportive of the contentions of
plaintiffs here, some of which we respectfully present for
consideration by the Court.
1.

It says, as to the requirement that adverse

possession need be "continuous and uninterrupted," that:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-25-

"This does not necessarily mean that the possessor mu,.; t
side on or be physically present at the property

(~.

'.'""-

v. G.,

322 P.2d 789, 3 Am.Jur.2d, Adv. Poss., Secs. 50, 5GJ.
2.

That "The nature of possession to meet this

requirement depends on the character of the property.

Gne

test is whether the adverse possessor has used the land as
'an average owner of similar property would use it.'"

(F.

v. E., 436 P.2d 582; Cooper v. Carter, 7 Utah 2d 9).
3.

That "Any one of the acts •

standi:iu, alone

might be insufficient, but in combination deLlonstrate continuous and uninterrupted possession.
4.

"Other courts have found similar acti_vi ty suffi-

cient for adverse possession of forested land in rural areas."
(24 A.L.R.2d 632).
5.

As to "notorious" possession:

"The owner need

not know about the presence of an adverse possession; - what
a duly alert owner would have known, the owner is charged
with knowing.'"

6.

(C v K. 237 P.2d 1053 (Ida. 1951).

We cannot expect the possessor of uninhabited

and forested land to do what the possessor of urban residential land would do before we charge the record owner with
notice.
Statutes having to do with acquisition of rights
by adverse possession, like those dealing with prescriptive rights under the comraon law right based on possession
of another's land for more than 20 years, are ordinarily
referred to as statutes of "repose."

It is suggested that the

instant case can be affirmed on any "time frame" basis, since
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the Bambergers have had possession for 70 years.

It is further

urged that the complimentary requirements found in the Utah
7-year statute, have been satisfied as to "payment of taxes"
and "use," - particularly "for the ordinary use of the
occupant under Sec. 78-12-9(3).

Such principle of laying

titles to rest has been employed progressively more and more,
and with greater liberality.

The Utah Court has so embraced

it on a number of occasions, reflected by the following
cases:
In Dye v. Miller & Viele, 587 P.2d 139 (Utah 1978)
the Utah Supreme Court adopted such principle by expressly
affirming Peterson v. Callister, 2 Utah 2d 359, 313 P.2d 814
(Utah 1955) and Hansen v. Morris, 3 Utah 2d 310, 283 P.2d 884
(Utah 1953), which applied it.

Others are Cope v. Bountiful

Livestock, 13 Utah 2d 20, 368 P.2d 68 (Utah 1962); and Falconaero v. Bowers , 16 Utah 2d 202, 398 P.2d 206 (Utah).
The principle aptly is stated in the opinion of a
sister state, - Alaska v. Linck, supra, which says:
"The trial court's decision furthers
the public policies underlying the law
of adverse possession. While, like
other statutes keep stale cases out of
the courts, they serve other important
public policies as well. They exist
because of a belief "that title to land
should no't long be in doubt, that society
will benefit from someone's making use of
land the owner leaves idle, and that
third persons who come to regard the
occupant as owner may be protected."
The defendant cites only one case that even remotely could be germane here, - Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, 578
P.2d 520 (Utah 1978).
tive force.

Clearly, however, it has no disposi-

No Motion for Summary Judgment was involved.
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There was a plenary trial, resulting in disputed facts, one
of which was that one of the two contesting, joint tenancy
brothers, conceded that they talked about selling their
property after the one had operated the farm for 10 years
unprofitably, and had left, and which then was farmed by the
other, who, after seven years, attempted to convey full
title to a third party.

There were few, if any facts,

similar to those in the instant case.

It is simply an

adverse possession case where the trial court believed the
first brother's evidence as opposed to the other's, which the
Utah Supreme Court also chose to believe, by affirming the
judgment.

-28-
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CONCLUSION
THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED FOR THE FOLLOWING
REASONS:
1.

The defendants' Answer is an unsupported, un-

verified pleading which cannot preclude the granting of a
Summary Judgment under Rule 56(c) and (e).

This alone

should decide this case.
2.

It is undisputed that Ernest Bamberger and his

successors have satisfied "payment of taxes" requirements,
evidenced by the record and stipulation of the defendant.
3.

It is undisputed that they have had actual,

constructive and continuous possession of the claims, as
shown in the abstract, document of title and otherwise.
4.

Schulders have made no claim to possession

other than through the original 1911 deed.
5.

No one ever has offered to reimburse Bamberger

or his successors for taxes and other expenses.
6.

The Record shows that Schulders knew or reason-

ably should have known of Bambergers' adverse claim of
ownership.
7.

People acquainted with the area and claims

understood the claims were owned solely by the Bamberger
interests; and that they had not known of any claim being
registered by Schulders in the unfenced, forested property
claimed by Bambergers.
8.

That neighbors even settled contiguous bound-

aries on the assumption that the Bambergers were sole owners.
9,

That they treated the claims as unfenced,
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forested mining claims,

~s

they own, without necessity of

cultivation or fencing.
10.

That Sec. 78-12-9(3) allows for title by

adverse possession, if the property is used for one of four
reasons, i.e., "for the ordinary use of the occupant;" that
in which Bamberger was well known,
11.

That Bambergers

- mining.

protect~d

the property by

possession, payment of taxes, and actively keeping the title
straightened out with the County officials.
12.

That the claims were never listed in Schulder's

probate; but were in Bamberger's.
13.

That even after this suit was filed, and for

18 months, defendant or no one else, personally or as
representative, offered or tendered into Court, any reimbursement for taxes or expenses incurred against the property, nor for a period of at least 68 years.
14.

That defendant's cited authorities are not

pertinent under the facts developed by plaintiffs in the
pleading and procedural process requirements.
15.

The defendant erred in Point I I of his Brief

when he claimed respondents had not paid the taxes within
the 7-year statutory period.

The record reflects that the

taxes were paid, and he was talking about different property.
16.
is not germane.

The only authority cited by appellant clearly
There was no Motion for Summary Judgment

involved, a trial was had on disputed testimony and the
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trial court believed to be against a finding of adverse
possession.
Respectfully submitted,

c~H·~

10 So. Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101
Attorney for Respondents.
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MAILING CEKTIPICATE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Respondents' Brief was mailed, postage prepaid,
to James A. Murphy and Tel Charlier, Attorneys for Defendant
and Appellant, 376 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah
84101, on this

day of June, 1981.
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